

2--DRAFT-WRK/lvj
26 November 1951

SUBJECT: CIA/OPC's Contribution to the National Psychological Strategy

I

1. There are indications that the Psychological Strategy Board may soon ask OPC to suggest to it important elements of an overall national strategy for the conduct of U. S. affairs during the next several years. This requirement includes

a. An opinion of the feasibility and desirability of bringing about successful revolution in one or more of the satellite countries

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b. Plans for the successful detachment of those satellites, including China, with or without revolution, where feasibility is believed to exist -- such plans to specify (1) feasibility, priority, emphasis and pace; (2) manpower and logistic requirements.

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c. An opinion of feasibility and desirability of bringing about successful revolution in the USSR and such plans as may be pertinent in the light of that opinion, the plans to specify (1) feasibility; priority; emphasis and pace; (2) manpower and logistic requirements.

d. A report on progress of attempts to encourage high-level defection and to unite and direct the efforts of these groups of refugees, defectors, and others who have fled the power of the Soviet Union, and on the availability of such groups as instruments of United States policy.

2. Assuming this task is officially laid on OPC, what follows is a first rough draft attempt at establishing the framework in which the problem might be solved.

II. THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE

1. The subject is: Inducing Individual or Collective Defection, a) Inside Russia; b) Her Satellites. Presumably, the objective is to achieve the foregoing on a more or less permanent basis so that the world can have for half a century at least what is termed "peace".

2. The pitch then would appear to be as follows:

a. Bring about a short-range basis enough defection, discontent, and opposition to keep the Politburo so off-balance~~/~~, confused, and uncertain that they dare not declare all-out war.

b. Fashion the vehicle, mechanism, or charge designed to accomplish this defection so that it readily may be converted into a long-term catalyst.

3. a. A military commander places the bulk of his artillery fire on the targets which will be most remunerative in overall furtherance of his battle. In all our Psych (cold war) objectives, we scatter our shots; miss the primary objective; try to cover the whole front.

b. Another axiom of war or games is to play against the opponent's greatest weaknesses. We (The United States) play the field. Too many un-coordinated plays by too many players.

III. FACTORS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN APPROACHING THIS PROBLEM

1. The Likelihood of War:

a. It is the essence of U. S. policy to end the current cold war struggle with the Soviet Union without the course to war although the risk of war is not excluded.

b. The current situation is characterized by an increasing rigidity of U. S. policy and, likewise, Soviet counteractions.

c. Both major powers are rearming at an accelerated rate and both are endeavoring to consolidate their direction or guidance of the peoples under their control or allied with them.

d. The American policy of passive containment has ended but no specific plan of positive counteraction exists.

2. The Status Quo:

a. Can the U. S. accept the present limits of the Soviet empire allowing the Soviets to develop complete control and

domination of the satellite areas and China?

b. Can the U. S. permit any further Soviet expansion of the Soviet Empire — by actions a la Korea?

c. Can the Soviet Union accept any significant counter-action of its present sphere of influence and control?

3. General Actions Open:

There are three general courses of action which the U. S. can follow:

a. Admit that the long-range co-existence of the USSR as presently organized — is incompatible with the survival of the U. S., and go to war to destroy Soviet power.

CPYRGHT (~~with Boss~~)

"Fact One: "A fatalistic feeling has pervaded both major political parties that we can solve our own and the world's problems only by overthrowing the expanding Soviet empire by force of arms. This fatalism has spread so widely among the American people that we no longer pay much attention to the most belligerent statements by our representatives in Washington.

"Fact Two: If our objective is overthrow of the Soviet dictatorship, then all-out war is inevitable, according to the latest estimates in Washington. For years now we have tested out an assortment of half-measures in our conflict with the Soviet empire, but the Soviet dictatorship has not been seriously hurt. Our costly programs can be considered successful only if our objective is to slow down Soviet expansion, and not to overthrow the Soviet dictatorship." (*Demure Boss, 12/1/57*)

b. Let nature take its course — Abandon all efforts to disrupt or subvert Soviet control over that which is now within its sphere — this will enable the Soviets to continue their consolidation with the least outside interference and/or

permit the internal disintegration of the Soviet Union to take place, if it is to take place, due to inherent flaws in its present structure and methods.

~~(cite Crankshaw)~~

"The Cold War and Stalin's lack of inhibitions about aggressive war in principle are facts; and we have to take notice of them. In the long run it may be only our power to resist which will keep the Soviet Union within bounds until such time as, by whatever means, her new middle class reaches maturity and either seizes control of the government in catastrophe and reverses its whole policy or else gradually, and with the passage of time, by increasing influence and pressure, itself becomes the government."

(Crankshaw, '951)

c. Undertake actively to subvert and detach elements of the Soviet Empire from the direction and control of the Kremlin and/or endeavor to promote a basic change in the Soviet government perhaps by revolution (the PSB query).

4. Analysis of the Three Courses:

a. Our official policy disclaims the inevitability of war — yet the psychology that war is inevitable is implicit in many of our operations. Our national psychology seems to be dominated by the assumption that war will take place. This assumption is not so stated in any national policy papers but it nevertheless influences many of the actions undertaken as a part of national policy at the departmental and lower level. Should we accept this approach as our best bet and move ahead accordingly?

b. A laissez-faire policy would require serious modifications in our current cold war strategy. For example, it would imply abandonment of the satellite allies and the cessation of VOA and other propaganda aimed at the Soviet controlled regions with the aim of sustaining hope in their eventual liberation.

Opinion - For the U. S. to assert now to a policy reversal on the question of liberation of satellite personnel of the satellite countries would admit a serious morale defeat and would lead to the eventual dissolution of U. S. alliances.

c. Placing the maximum strategy on the Soviet strength or power including the relationship between the USSR and satellite and Communist China — this represents the latest refinement of U. S. policy (10/5). It officially recognizes that we cannot abandon the satellite areas to Soviet domination. It does, however, recognize that if such a strategy is to be applied, it involves the risk of war as a lesser evil than the acceptance of war or the acceptance of the present borders of the Soviet Empire.

5. CIA/OPC is already charged in a general sort of way with making preparations for a serious subversion of Soviet power leading to the retraction of the Soviet sphere of influence. So far our efforts have been hampered by not being part of a thoroughly integrated, positive world program.

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"If the non-communist world adopts a bold and adequate policy and takes the initiative in carrying it out, the communists will be thrown back on the political defensive. Then many even of their apparent advantages would be turned into obstacles. Their morale, dependent on the sense of political superiority, would be undermined. The political vacuums into which they now pour would be filled from the opposite direction. The walls of their strategic Eurasian fortress, so apparently firm now as much because of the absence of pressure without as from strength within, would begin to crumble." (? au Tar)

What are the questions which must be considered in devising a strategy to achieve this objective within the foreseeable period of time? Some of these questions are:

- a. What should be the real target? — The Kremlin? — that is, shall we mount a direct attack on the dominant group within the USSR or the dominant group within the satellite areas?
- b. Should we use the strategy of the direct approach? directly to the target, if the Kremlin is the real target — or the indirect approach by attacking the satellite tentacles of the Soviet apparatus?
- c. Should we combine and properly weight attacks aimed simultaneously at the most vulnerable satellites and simultaneously direct our efforts at the Soviet apparatus itself?

~~(cite Barnham)~~

"Communism has grown beyond the powers of any single people acting alone and unsupported. The defeat of communism anywhere must be part of the mutual struggle of non-communists everywhere. It is, moreover, the peoples of the

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Soviet sphere who most need aid. When - and only when - they have rid themselves of their communist masters, we will find it easy enough to solve the now unanswerable riddle of 'how to get along with Russia.' " (Burnham)

d. After choosing either one or both objectives, what targets should we endeavor to hit to gain them? Should we aim at the top Communist leaders wither in Russia or the satellites and endeavor to divide and split them so as to bring about their own downfall by fighting amongst each other rather than against us?

e. Should we aim to split the middle ranks of the Communist apparatus and separate them from the small elite kernels of Communist leadership or should we aim to arouse the great mass of satellite or Soviet people to active resistance against the Communist masters.

6. Operations Against the Satellites:

a. Which satellite states are potentially vulnerable to U. S. sponsored subversion?

b. Which satellite states might be detached from the Soviet sphere without the risk of war?

c. When might a satellite country be detached from the Soviet sphere with the least risk of war?

d. The detachment of which satellite state will promote a spontaneous chain reaction within the Soviet system?

e. Can preparations for the detachment of a given satellite be undertaken by covert means alone or must they be geared with a comprehensive overt psychological and political preparation and

with detailed plans for the intervention of external military forces?

- f. How essential is subversion of the Soviet or Satellite armed forces?
- g. How cynical can we be in planning for satellite subversion, e.g., can we encourage Tito to liberate Albania and perhaps expand Titoism into Bulgaria and Rumania? If technically feasible, such an operation might have further political repercussions with regard to a long-range objective in other areas of Eastern Europe.

7. With Regard to the USSR:

- a. What are our chances of developing a revolution within the USSR during the next two or three years?
- b. What are our chances of promoting defection within the Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Germany and Austria?
- c. How capable are we of playing upon Soviet suspicions primarily from the outside? For example, can we set Beria against Malenkov by planned patterns of deception, stress emigre rumors, etc. operating almost entirely from outside the Soviet borders.
- d. How significant a power event will be the death of Stalin?
- e. How prolonged and intense will be the struggle for power within the politburo, secret police, and Army following Stalin's death or following his political incapacitation?

~~Crankshaw~~

"The gulf between the Communist Party of today and its own Central Committee is indicated by the fact that the last party congress, the eighteenth, took place in 1939, twelve years ago, whereas congresses were once held every two or three years. It may scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the gulf between the party and the Kremlin is greater now than the gulf between the party and the people. And it is increasing. For another complaint of the Central Committee, growing in volume and intensity, is that the children are no longer joining the Young Communist League, the Komsomol, in sufficient numbers; and too great a proportion of those who do join regard it only as a kind of social privilege.

"For thirty years first Lenin and then Stalin have governed the Soviet Union through the party, backed by all the power of the police. If the party becomes an unreliable instrument, that leaves only the police." (Crankshaw)

- f. How important are the nationalist elements within the USSR as targets for significant subversive operations?

~~Crankshaw~~

"It is hard to tell how much the Russian people can stand without breaking down; certainly they can stand more than the minority nationalities of the Union. These are now troubling the Kremlin so deeply that the radical dilution of these nationalities is being pushed forward at great speed, the natives of the various republics, from Ukraine to Kazakhstan, being moved about and mixed together with the object of destroying each and every focus of national spirit." (Crankshaw)

- g. How important is the friction which might be developed within the Communist party and the Army and the Secret Police and the Soviet Army?
- h. Can enough people be found who will take the risk involved in carrying out a theoretical feasible subversion campaign against the USSR?
- i. What is the boiling point of Russian resistance to harsh

authority; in other words, how much can the Russian people take before they will actively engage in political,

psychological resistance to the Soviet regime?

"It should be clear by now that the Russian unthinkingly accepts deprivations of liberty which we will not accept, and that he can live and flourish in conditions of hardship unthinkable to us. It is also true to say that after so many years of life at its harshest he will accept worse evils than he was ready to accept in 1917. When we are thinking of the appalling conditions of the labor camps, for example, we should remember the appalling conditions of the average Russian village." (Crankshaw)

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j. What are the chances of individual vis-a-vis mass

25X1A defection:

"Others still ask why, if things are as bad as I have said, there are not more refugees, more desertions from the Soviet army and missions serving abroad. I have tried to show that hatred of the regime is not a new thing to the Russians, and does not lead to immediate, reasoned action. Love of country, too, runs very deep, and this we should understand.

"Those who try to cross the frontier are shot, and those soldiers who are tempted to desert while serving in Germany and Austria have perpetually before their eyes the decree of the Supreme Soviet, which tells them in the simplest language that the whole family or any soldier who deserts while serving abroad will be sentenced to five years' corrective labor 'in the remote regions of Siberia'.

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k. What is the significance of an overall U.S. political program to the success of our operations?

~~Burnham~~

"The lock-bolt of the entire structure of communist plans is political. For them, everything depends on their continuing to have political superiority and to maintain the political initiative. If they do, they win either way, war or no war, war soon or war delayed. Whatever happens, their policy, with its fixed goal of world conquest, will be steadily advancing." (Burnham)

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3/27

27 Nov

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I have indicated
but a few minor
Editorial Changes.

The thought strikes
me that there is
too much meat in
this for the P&B
people to attempt
to chew, leave
alone digest it.

Are we going to come
up with a few
pithy, punchy recommendations
in Final? (D)

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